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Abstract
How can a receiver design an information structure in order to elicit information
from a sender? We study how a decision-maker can acquire more information from
an agent by reducing her own ability to observe what the agent transmits. Intuitively,
when the two parties’ preferences are not perfectly aligned, this garbling relaxes the
sender’s concern that the receiver will use her information to the sender’s disadvantage.
We characterize the optimal information structure for the receiver. The main result is
that under broad conditions, the receiver can do just as well as if she could commit
to a rule mapping the sender’s message to actions: information design is just as good
as full commitment. Similarly, we show that these conditions guarantee that ex ante
information acquisition always benets the receiver, even though this learning might
actually lower the receiver’s expected payo in the absence of garbling. We illustrate
these eects in a range of economically relevant examples.
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1 Introduction
In that open eld
If you do not come too close, if you do not come too close,
On a summer midnight, you can hear the music...
T.S. Eliot
East Coker
There is a decision-maker faced with choosing an action in an uncertain world. She does
not have direct access to information about the state of the world, but there is a second
person who does. The second person (or sender) observes the state (equivalently, his type)
before sending a message1, which the decision-maker (or receiver) observes before taking an
1We term the sender’s action a message in order to distinguish it from the receiver’s action. In some settings,
like for instance cheap talk games, the moniker is tting. In others, like for instance the Spence (1978) [31] model
of signaling through education attainment, where the sender chooses his level of education, labeling his action
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action. This scenario is called a communication game (or a signaling game), and the class of
such games includes cheap talk games, like that studied in Crawford and Sobel (1982) [10];
and costly signaling games, like that studied in Spence (1978) [31].
In nearly all of the literature, and for much of this paper, the message chosen by the
sender does not enter into the receiver’s utility function; hence, the sender’s message has
only instrumental value to the receiver. Consequently, the receiver’s only concern is infor-
mation transmission: she2 values only the information content of the message, and so nat-
urally her welfare increases as the sender’s messages become more informative. However,
there are a number of potential frictions that could impede this information transmission.
First, the sender’s and the receiver’s preferences over the action taken may be imperfectly
aligned. Second, the messages may be costly to the sender, which costs aect the messages
that are chosen in equilibrium. As a result, less than full information may be transmitted at
equilibrium, and the frictions may even be so severe that no information is transmitted.
Now, suppose that the receiver is not forced to observe the sender’s message directly,
but may commit ex ante to observe a noisy signal of the message instead. That is, suppose
the receiver may choose the degree of transparency, or information structure, in the game.
Can less than full transparency help the receiver? Moreover, if less than full transparency is
benecial, then what does the (receiver-)optimal degree of transparency look like, and how
can the receiver solve the problem of designing the optimal information structure?
If this were a decision problem in which the information were exogenous, i.e. if there were
no sender and instead the message sent to the receiver about the state were from nature, then
the answer to the rst question would clearly be no. Namely, if the message were exogenous,
then the receiver would always (at least weakly) prefer to observe the message itself rather
than some noisy signal. Conversely, here, the message is not exogenous, but is instead an
equilibrium choice of the sender. Crucially, the sender is aware of the degree of transparency,
which thus aects the message, or distribution over messages, that he sends at equilibrium.
There is an important trade-o present in the receiver’s choice of information structure.
a message is less appropriate.
2Throughout, to simplify the language, we arbitrarily impose that the receiver is female and the sender is
male.
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By choosing a more informative signal of the message, the receiver obtains more information
for any xed strategy vector of the sender types. On the other hand, the vector of strategies
chosen by the sender types, and hence the information, is an endogenous choice of the sender
that he makes cognizant of the information structure. Thus, less transparency may beget a
more informative vector of strategies at equilibrium. The optimal degree of transparency
arises as a consequence of these trade-os, and it may strictly benet the receiver to choose
a less informative signal of the sender’s message. In short, less than full transparency can
strictly benet the receiver.
The following example illustrates this observation. Sender and receiver are employees of
a rm: the receiver is part of upper management, the Chief Operations Ocer (COO), say;
and the sender is a (local) branch manager. The COO is contemplating whether to close the
branch (action 퐶) or not (action 푂). The branch is either viable (state 휃퐺) or not (state 휃퐵) and
the COO would like to close the branch if the state is 휃퐵 and keep the branch open otherwise.
Explicitly, the COO’s payos are푢푅(푂, 휃퐺) = 푢푅(퐶, 휃퐵) = 1, and 푢푅(푂, 휃퐵) = 푢푅(퐶, 휃퐺) = 0
The COO is unable to observe directly the viability of the branch. Instead, the branch
manager is “on the ground" and observes the state. The branch manager must make an
investment decision, whether to buy new equipment, say; and all else equal, the branch
manager would prefer to invest (message 퐼 ) if and only if the state is 휃퐺 . On the other hand
the branch manager would prefer the branch be kept open no matter the state; and, crucially,
the payos are such that the branch manager would rather choose the incorrect investment
decision for the state and have the branch be kept open than choose the correct investment
level and have the branch be closed. The state-dependent utilities for the branch manager
for each message, action combination are(퐼 , 푂) (퐼 , 퐶) (푁 , 퐶) (푁 , 푂)휃퐺 3 1 0 2휃퐵 2 0 1 3
Both COO and branch manager share the common prior 휇0 ∶= Pr (Θ = 휃퐺) = 2/3: the
branch is more likely to be viable than not.
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Figure 1: Whether to Close the Branch, Full Transparency
The full transparency scenario is depicted in Figure 1. There, no equilibria exist in which
any information is transmitted. The only equilibria are pooling–those in which the branch
manager chooses the same message no matter the state–and so the COO’s posterior is the
same as her prior. The logic behind this is simple: there can be no equilibrium in which both퐼 and 푁 are sent in such a way that the COO strictly prefers to take a dierent action after
each message. In such a circumstance, the local manager who knows the state is 휃퐵 always
prefers to deviate to the message that is followed by the branch being kept open (푂). The
COO’s payo is 2/3.
Suppose we introduce a neutral third party, a middle manager, say, who oversees the
branch manager. The COO no longer observes the message of the branch manager; instead,
the middle manager witnesses the message before communicating to the COO. Because the
middle manager is neutral, we may model him as a signal, a stochastic map 휋 ∶ 푀 → Δ(푋 )
where 푋 is some (nite) set of signal realizations. For any message 푚 sent by the branch
manager, the middle manager sends signal realization 푥 to the COO with probability 휋 (푥 |푚).
One possible signal is one that is completely uninformative and involves just one signal
realization, the statement (everything is ) 푓 푖푛푒–no matter what message the sender chooses,
the middle manager says that “everything is ne." Formally, the set of signal realizations is푋 = {푓 푖푛푒}, and 휋 (푓 푖푛푒|퐼 ) = 휋 (푓 푖푛푒|푁 ) = 1
We term this signal no transparency, and this scenario is depicted in Figure 2. As in
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Figure 2: Whether to Close the Branch, No Transparency
the full transparency case, no information is transmitted at equilibrium, but now the branch
managers separate and send dierent messages. In particular, the branch manager in the low
state does not invest, since he knows that the receiver will not be able to identify him from
this choice due to the garbling by the signal. As in the full transparency case, the COO’s
payo is 2/3.
No transparency is too extreme, and the COO can increase her payo by choosing a
more moderately uninformative signal. Indeed, the optimal signal is one in which the middle
manager sends one of two signal realizations; 푋 = {푓 푖푛푒, 푏푎푑}. If the branch manager invests
then the middle manager always sends ne, and if he doesn’t invest then the middle manager
sends ne half of the time and bad the other half of the time. Formally, the optimal signal is
휋 (푏푎푑 |푁 ) = 12 , 휋 (푏푎푑 |퐼 ) = 0휋 (푓 푖푛푒|푁 ) = 12 , 휋 (푓 푖푛푒|퐼 ) = 1
The optimal signal is depicted in Figure 3. After 푓 푖푛푒 the COO keeps the branch open
(using Bayes’ law she believes that the branch is viable with probability 4/5), and after 푏푎푑 she
closes the branch (she is certain that the branch is nonviable). The signal begets a separating
equilibrium–one in which local manager chooses not to invest if the branch is not viable and
chooses to invest if it is. This gain in informativeness outweighs the garbling by the signal,
and the COO obtains a strictly higher equilibrium payo than with full transparency (5/6
versus 2/3).
The signal is pinned down by the incentives of the branch manager in state 휃퐵. The
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Figure 3: Whether to Close the Branch, Optimal Transparency
COO, in designing the information structure, gives local management just enough enough
incentive to be willing to separate. She is able to minimize the amount of time she chooses
the “wrongâĂİ action in relation to the state, and obtains more information due to the branch
manager’s willingness to separate.
The COO benets by not having direct oversight of the branch manager and instead
acquiring information through an intermediary. As stated above, the third party could be
internal, part of the “chain of command" within the company, or it could be an external
auditor. If the COO could directly observe the branch manager’s decision, she would not
be able to credibly commit to not exploiting the information provided by a branch manager.
Thus, with full transparency, she would obtain no information. She would benet if instead
she had a go-between who observed the branch manager’s decision before providing her
with a recommendation.
Throughout this paper, we explore the problem of solving for the receiver-optimal3 de-
gree of transparency in communication games. We restrict attention to the environment in
which the sender and receiver share a common prior, and allow for arbitrary state-dependent
preferences for the sender and receiver over both the sender’s message and the receiver’s ac-
tion. For most of this paper we focus on what we term simple signaling games, which are
those in which the receiver has no intrinsic preferences over the message chosen by the
sender. That is, they are games in which the message chosen by the sender is not an argu-
3We focus throughout on the receiver-optimal Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium. Henceforth, by equilibrium
we refer to the PBE that is best for the receiver.
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ment of the receiver’s utility function–e.g. in the example with the rm above, the COO is
indierent about whether the local manager chooses to make an investment outside of the
information that the choice contains.
Solving for the receiver-optimal information structure is dicult in general. The receiver
solves an optimization problem with two sets of constraints: given the signal and vector of
strategies by the sender types, the receiver’s action must be sequentially rational; and the
vector of strategies by the sender types must itself be an equilibrium. This is a maximization
problem with incentive compatibility constraints for the dierent sender types and obedience
constraints for the receiver.
There is a useful upper bound for the solution to this problem: the commitment solution
for the receiver, which corresponds to the scenario in which the receiver can commit to a dis-
tribution over actions conditioned on the sender’s choice of message. This is just the optimal
transparency problem with the obedience (sequential rationality) constraints relaxed. Hence,
if the commitment strategy that maximizes the receiver’s payo also satises the receiver’s
obedience constraints, then it must correspond to the optimal information structure. The
commitment problem is much simpler to solve, and we establish that it reduces to a simple
linear program.
In the main result of this paper, Theorem 3.3, we establish that in any simple signal-
ing game with two actions, “Opacity equals CommitmentâĂİ. Namely, for any number of
states and messages, provided the receiver has at most two actions, the optimal commitment
solution satises the receiver’s obedience constraints. Thus, to solve the information de-
sign problem we need only search for a solution to the much simpler commitment problem.
Furthermore, such results need not be limited merely to simple signaling games. We also
establish sucient conditions that guarantee that in non-simple signaling games with two
receiver actions the receiver’s optimal transparency solution is equivalent to the commitment
solution. Moreover, these conditions are quite natural and hold for a variety of settings, in-
cluding a paradigmatic game in biology, the Sir Philip Sidney game4, and a political setting,
which we explore in Section 5.2.
4Optimal transparency in this game is the subject of Whitmeyer (2019) [34].
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These ideas have implications and applications in numerous additional scenarios, due to
the pervasiveness of situations in which signaling plays a role. For instance, the advertising
choices made by rms famously serve as signals (see the seminal papers Nelson 1974, Mil-
grom and Roberts 1986) [27, 24], as do the warranties that rms oer (Gal-Or 1989) [14]. Here,
our results suggest that consumers may benet from recommender or ratings systems or “ex-
pert" advice, which serve as intermediaries and aid consumers by providing coarse advice.
Another venue is venture-capital, where the equity-retainment decisions by entrepreneurs
signal their private information (Leland and Pyle 1977) [23]. Mandatory full disclosure or
total transparency about the entrepreneur’s stake; thus, may be to the investor’s detriment.
Headhunting and stang services are widespread, and can aid hiring rms by their role
as an information intermediary. Namely, the hiring rm may benet by delegating the job of
acquiring information about the prospective candidate’s education to the headhunter. The
Beer-Quiche game of Cho and Kreps (1987) [9] can be viewed as an allegory for an incumbent
rm signaling to a potential entrant through its pricing decisions. Accordingly, there is a role
for third party consultants who can condense and even obfuscate to the aspiring entrant. Fi-
nally, policy decisions by governments convey private information about their competence
or aims. Hence, this work suggests that a populace may benet from a free press that occa-
sionally hides the incumbent’s actions. Sunlight may not be the best disinfectant–sometimes
it is better to leave a few things in the dark.
In the companion paper to this one, Whitmeyer (2019) [33], we explore the value of in-
formation in two player communication games with full transparency. While it is clear that
in any setting, information acquisition may benet the receiver, our goal in that paper is to
uncover in which settings ex ante learning is always benecial. To put another way, suppose
that the receiver may, prior to the communication game, acquire public information in the
form of the realization of some Blackwell experiment (Blackwell 1951 [4]). It is obvious that
some experiments benet the receiver, e.g. a fully informative experiment always does; but
is it true that any experiment benets the receiver?
Surprisingly, even in simple games with just two actions ex ante information acquisition
may hurt the receiver if she cannot choose the information structure in the ensuing game.
However, as we nd in this paper, in two action simple games, if the receiver may choose
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the optimal information structure, then information acquisition is always benecial. Thus,
in the class of binary action simple communication games, the ability to choose the optimal
degree of transparency ensures that the value of information is always positive, even though
with full transparency it may not be.
All-in-all, we discover that information design is remarkably powerful. In two-action
simple communication games, it allows the receiver to obtain a payo as high as that which
she could achieve with commitment. Moreover, it guarantees that ex ante information can
only help her, even though without information design it may harm.
Section 2 presents the formal model, Section 3 explores the connection between the
receiver-optimal information structure and commitment, and Section 4 explores the pos-
sible benets and drawbacks to ex ante learning. Section 5 illustrates applications of these
ideas in nance/accounting, political economy, and the academic job market in economics;
and Section 6 concludes.
1.1 Related Work
The past decade has seen a rapid proliferation of works that explore the underlying ideas
from Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011) [20] in dierent ways. In that paper, as well as in many
of the works that followed, the underlying information is exogenous, and the persuader’s
(or persuaders’) problem is how to transmit this information in a particular way in order to
induce one or many receivers to take actions favorable (or at least as favorable as possible) to
the persuader(s). In some sense; then, this paper can be viewed as the inverse of the Bayesian
Persuasion problem. Instead of a sender aiming to persuade a receiver; here, a receiver seeks
to elicit information from a sender–hence, “Bayesian Elicitation".
More recently, commencing with Boleslavsky and Kim (2017) [8], the literature has ex-
plored the situation in which the information is endogenous (in fact, in Boleslavsky and
Kim, the state itself is endogenous). That is, there is now some information generation pro-
cess, which is itself aected by the information structure or signal chosen by the persuader.
In Boleslavsky and Kim, this is manifested in the form of a moral hazard problem for the
agent–the signal must not only convince the receiver, but provide incentives for the agent
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as well.
In this paper, the principal is, herself, the receiver, and so the signal is in part designed to
persuade her. However, the sender is also conscious of the signal, and his choice of action is
shaped by the signal. Accordingly, the optimal signal is chosen not just with persuasion in
mind but incentive provision as well. This dual objective is also present in Asriyan, Fuchs,
and Green (2017) [2]. In their model, 푁 + 1 sellers have an indivisible asset whose value
is private information, and have two periods in which they may trade it. In the portion of
the paper relevant to this one, they ask how a planner “should disclose trade behavior to
maximize social welfare". As these authors note, persuasion is not the only objective, since
the information policy “aects the information content of trading, and hence aects trading
itself". Other papers that involve similar trade-os include Le Treust and Tomala (2017) [22]
and Giorgadis and Szentes (2017) [16]. To help deal with some technical issues related to this
idea of a “constrained information design" problem, several authors have written notes, see
Doval and Skreta (2018) [11] and Zhong (2018) [35].
Ball (2019) [3] investigates the design of a scoring rule in order to elicit information from
a sender who can distort multiple features (what the receiver can observe) about himself.
Ball’s paper echoes the trade-o that we consider here, that, “the intermediary must consider
how the scoring rule motivates the sender to distort her features.” Analogously, he nds that
coarser information can benet the receiver due to the endogeneity of the information, which
is produced by the sender.
Another paper that bears mention is Salamanca (2017) [30]. There the author relaxes the
commitment assumption endemic to the Bayesian persuasion literature and introduces a me-
diator, who facilitates communication. Communication is cheap talk, though as in this paper
there is the interplay between the persuasion motive and the obedience/incentive compati-
bility requirement for the information designer.
The paper closest to this one is Rick (2013) [28], who forwards the idea that mis-communication–
what we in this paper refer to as limited transparency–can be useful in communication
games, which category encompasses costly signaling games (e.g. Spence (1978) [31]), cheap
talk (e.g. Crawford and Sobel (1982) [10]), and games with veriable messages (e.g. Gross-
man (1981) [18]). He assigns Pareto weights to the dierent sender types and receiver, and
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asks how mis-communication can be helpful (welfare improving). It can improve equilib-
rium information transmission without raising communication costs and/or it can reduce
communication costs without changing the quality of information transmission.
Rick focuses on communication games in which the receiver does not have preferences
over the message sent by the sender (what we term simple signaling games in this paper)
and the sender’s payo is additively separable in his benet from the sender’s action and his
cost of sending a message. As Rick shows, benets from mis-communication, if there are
any, must come from at least one of two sources: 1. mis-communication can remove some
protable deviations to unused messages and 2. mis-communication can expand the set of
strategy proles that implements a given distribution of posteriors in equilibrium.
In contrast to Rick’s paper, we explore the receiver’s problem, which allows for dierent
results. In particular, if the receiver has two actions we nd an equivalence between the com-
mitment problem and the information design problem (for simple signaling games). In short,
the focus of this work is not that the receiver may benet from less than full transparency
but instead how she should choose the degree of transparency optimally.
There are other papers in the literature that explore the benets of noise and look at op-
timal information structures in cheap talk settings. Myerson (1991) [26] famously describes
a cheap talk game in which messages are sent via carrier pigeon. Remarkably, a somewhat
wayward pigeon, one who occasionally becomes lost, improves communication between the
two players. In a well known paper, Forges (1990) [13] considers mediation in a job-market
example, in which the signals about the prospective candidate’s type are cheap talk. As in
the other papers in this literature, this introduction of a mediator enlarges the size of the set
of equilibrium payos.
Quite a few other papers–Goltsman, Hörner, Pavlov, and Squintani (2009) [17], Ganguly
and Ray (2011) [15], Ivanov (2009) [19], and Blume, Board, and Kawamura (2007) [5]–that
look at mediation in the context of cheap talk. However, due to the diculty of the prob-
lem, these papers focus on the uniform-quadratic setting from Crawford and Sobel (1982)
[10], and Blume et al. restricts mediation further to a specic form of noise: after the sender
chooses a message 푚 there is an error with some probability 휖, after which the receiver ob-
serves message 푚′ drawn from the uniform distribution on [0, 1], independent of the chosen
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message 푚. With probability 1 − 휖, there is no error and the receiver observes the chosen
message 푚. They show (in conjunction with Goltsman et al.) that in the uniform quadratic
setting this corresponds to the receiver-optimal information structure.
Because the messages are cheap talk, these papers, as does Salamanca, view the mediation
problem as a centralized, mechanism design problem. They use the idea of a Communication
Equilibrium, as formulated in Myerson (1986) [25] and Forges (1986) [12]. Each sender reports
his type to a mediator, who then sends a (possibly random) recommendation to the receiver.
In this paper, here, provided the game is cheap talk and the set of messages is suciently
large, the optimal signal 휋 is equivalent to the centralized mediator-driven problem analyzed
in these cheap talk papers (we can think of the separating equilibrium as the reporting of the
sender’s type). However, if the message set is not suciently large, then this equivalence is
lost. Moreover, if the messages are costly (i.e. the game is not cheap talk), then the problem
we explore is dierent to the centralized problems of the literature.
There is experimental evidence that senders respond to dierent information structures.
Blume, Lai, and Lim (2019) [6] examine a particular class of information structures, random-
ized response,5 and nd that randomized response can induce senders to be signicantly
more truthful. Note that they also nd that the information loss due to the intermediary’s
garbling may outweigh the gain in information due to the increased frequency of truthful-
ness. However, in a subsequent paper, Blume, Lai, and Lim (2019) [7] explore mediated cheap
talk experimentally and nd that mediation pushes sender types toward separation, which
increases the receiver’s payo. Crucially, both papers nd that the degree of transparency
does aect the sender’s behavior.
Finally, the notion that noise can improve communication has been mentioned in the
biology literature as well: Lachmann and Bergstrom (1998) [21] examine a specic signaling
game, the “Sir Philip Sidney" game and illustrate through an example that the receiver may
benet by having some degree of perceptual error. That is, they consider the game with
5Originally introduced by Warner (1965) [32], Blume et al. (2019) [6] use a simple version of the technique:
the sender is asked one of two yes or no questions before an intermediary reveals the answer to the receiver.
However, the intermediary may only partially reveal the question to which the answer corresponded, thereby
adding noise to the response.
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an exogenous garbling of the sender’s signal and argue that such an environment may be
benecial for the receiver. In addition, in concurrent work to this one, Whitmeyer (2019) [34]
looks at strategic inattention in the Sir Philip Sidney game, a paradigmatic signaling game in
biology. There, attention is restricted to specic information structures, those corresponding
to inattention on the part of the receiver; and we nd that the receiver always weakly (and
often strictly) benets from being somewhat inattentive.
2 The Model
The setup is a version of the standard communication game. There are two players: a sender,푆; and a receiver, 푅. The sender has private information, his type (or the state) 휃 ∈ Θ.
He observes his type and chooses a message, 푚, from the set of messages 푀 . The receiver
observes 푚, but not 휃 , updates her belief about the sender’s type and message using Bayes’
law, then chooses a mixture over actions. We assume that sets 푀 and Θ are nite.푆 and 푅 share a common prior over the state of the world, 휇0 ∈ Δ(Θ), where 휇0(휃) =Pr(Θ = 휃). Each player, 푆 and 푅, has state-dependent preferences over the message sent, and
the action taken, which are represented by the continuous utility functions 푢푖 , 푖 ∈ {푆, 푅}:푢푖 ∶ 푀 × 퐴 × Θ→ ℜ.
The timing of the game is as follows. First, 푆 observes his private type (or the state) 휃 ∈ Θ,
and chooses a message 푚 ∈ 푀 to send to 푅. 푅 observes 푚, updates her belief, and chooses
action 푎 ∈ 퐴.
We extend the utility functions for the players to behavioral strategies. A behavioral
strategy for 푆, 휎 (⋅|휃) is a probability distribution over 푀 . Similarly, a behavioral strategy for푅, 휌(⋅|푚) is a probability distribution over 퐴. 휎 (푚|휃) is the probability that a type 휃 sender
sends message 푚.
We focus on receiver-optimal Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium, which we dene in the stan-
dard manner. As noted in the introduction, by equilibrium or PBE, we refer to those particular
equilibria. In addition, throughout this paper, we focus primarily on signaling games that fall
into the following class:
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Denition 2.1. A communication game is Simple if the receiver has preferences over the
action taken, 푎, and the state (or sender’s type), 휃 , but not over the message chosen by the
sender, 푚. Equivalently, a game is simple provided the receiver’s preferences are represented
by the continuous utility function 푢푅 ∶ 퐴 × Θ→ ℜ.
2.1 Information Manipulation
The principal purpose of this paper is to explore receiver-optimal information structures,
alternatively termed the optimal degree of transparency, in the context of signaling games.
Suppose that 푅 can commit to an information structure in the following sense. There is a com-
pact set of signal realizations 푋 , where |푋 | ≥ |Δ(Θ)|, i.e. the receiver is unconstrained by the
size of this set. A signal 휋 is a mapping 휋 ∶ 푀 → Δ (푋 ), where 휋 (푥 |푚) ∶= Pr (푋 = 푥 |푀 = 푚).
Instead of observing푚, 푅 instead observes 푥 , before choosing a behavioral strategy 휌 ∶ 푋 →Δ(퐴) so as to maximize her expected utility.
The receiver’s value function is푉 = 푛∑푖=1 휇0(휃푖) 푡∑푗=1 휎푖(푚푗) 푢∑푒=1 휋 (푥푒 |푚푗) 푘∑푙=1 휌 (푎푙 |푥푒) 푢푅 (푚푗 , 푎푙 , 휃푖)
and she solves sup휋,휎,휌 {푉 }
such that 휌(푎푙 |푥푒) ∈ argmax휌(푎푙 |푥푒 ) { 푛∑푖=1 휇0 (휃푖) 푡∑푗=1 휎푖(푚푗)휋 (푥푒 |푚푗) 푘∑푙=1 휌 (푎푙 |푥푒) 푢푅 (푚푗 , 푎푙 , 휃푖)} (푂푙)
for all 푥푒 ∈ 푋 ; and휎푖 ∈ argmax휎푖 { 푡∑푗=1 휎푖(푚푗) 푢∑푒=1 휋 (푥푒 |푚푗) 푘∑푙=1 휌 (푎푙 |푥푒) 푢푆 (푚푗 , 푎푙 , 휃푖)} (퐼퐶푖)
for all 휃푖 ∈ Θ.
As we will shortly see, if the game is simple and the receiver only has two actions, the
maximization problem can be reduced to a nite collection of linear programming prob-
lems. Moreover, we also introduce the following denition and a subsequent “Revelation
Principle"-like result, which greatly simplies the receiver’s problem
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Denition 2.2. A signal, 휋 , is Direct if 푋 = 퐴. That is, a direct signal recommends actions.
Then, the following proposition establishes that it is without loss of generality to restrict
attention to direct signals, which recommend actions to the receiver.
Proposition 2.3. For any equilibrium triple, (휋, 휎, 휌), that yields a payo of 푣 to the receiver,
there is another equilibrium triple, (휋 ′, 휎 ′, 휌′), that yields the same payo, 푣, to the receiver;
where 휋 ′ is a direct signal, 휎 = 휎 ′, and 휌′(푎|푎′) = 1 for 푎′ = 푎 and 휌(푎|푎′) = 0 for 푎′ ≠ 푎.
Proof. Consider any equilibrium triple (휋, 휎, 휌). Now introduce for each 푥푒 and action 푎푙 in
the support of 휌(⋅|푥푒) two new mappings:
1. 휋̂ ∶ 푀 → Δ(퐴̂′), where 휋̂ (푎푒푙 |푚푗) ∶= 휋 (푥푒 |푚푗)휌(푎푙 |푥푒); and
2. 휌′, where 휌′(푎푙 |푎푒푙 ) = 1 and 휌′(푎푙 |푎푒푚) = 0.
That is, 푎푒푙 is the instruction to play 푎푙 that induces the same belief as 푥푒 . Clearly set 퐴̂ may
be larger than 퐴–it may have multiple “duplicate" recommendations.
By construction, for each 푎푒푙 , action 푎푙 is a best response. Moreover, it is easy to see
that both the obedience and IC constraints are satised and that the expected value for the
receiver is the same. Finally, introduce garbling 푔 ∶ 퐴̂ → Δ (퐴), where 푔(푎푖 |푎푒푙 ) = 1 for푖 = 푙 and 푔(푎푖 |푎푒푙 ) = 0 for 푖 ≠ 푙. Dene 휋 ′ ∶= 푔◦휋̂ . It is easy to see that the IC constraints
remain satised (since each message will lead to the same distribution of actions chosen by
the receiver). Moreover, the obedience constraints must be satised as well since 휋 ′ is less
Blackwell informative than 휋̂ : if it were optimal for the receiver to choose an action other
than 푎푙 after observing recommendation 푎푙 (recall that it is optimal for the receiver to choose푎푙 after 푎푒푙 for any 푒) then the receiver would have a higher payo under the less informative
distribution, which contradicts Blackwell’s Theorem (Blackwell 1951 [4]). Hence (휋 ′, 휎 ′, 휌′)
is also an equilibrium, and the receiver’s expected payo remains the same. ■
In the remainder of the paper, we restrict attention to direct signals, 휋 , and thus the
receiver’s problem can be reduced to
sup휋,휎 { 푛∑푖=1 휇0(휃푖) 푡∑푗=1 휎푖(푚푗) 푘∑푙=1 휋 (푎푙 |푚푗) 푢푅 (푚푗 , 푎푙 , 휃푖)} (⋆)
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such that푛∑푖=1 휇0 (휃푖) 푡∑푗=1 휎푖(푚푗)휋 (푎푙 |푚푗) 푢푅 (푚푗 , 푎푙 , 휃푖) ≥ 푛∑푖=1 휇0 (휃푖) 푡∑푗=1 휎푖(푚푗)휋 (푎푙 |푚푗) 푢푅 (푚푗 , 푎푙′ , 휃푖) (푂푙)
for all 푎푙 , 푎푙′ , 푙, 푙′ = 1,… , 푛; and휎푖 ∈ argmax휎푖 { 푡∑푗=1 휎푖(푚푗) 푘∑푙=1 휋 (푎푙 |푚푗) 푢푆 (푚푗 , 푎푙 , 휃푖)} (퐼퐶푖)
for all 휃푖 , 푖 = 1,… , 푛.
Importantly, as the following result states, it is not without loss of generality to restrict
the sender types to pure strategies.
Proposition 2.4. For three or more (receiver) actions, there is not always a solution to the
receiver’s optimal transparency problem in which each type of sender chooses a pure strategy.
Proof. Proof is via counterexample. We revisit the game from Lemma 4.3 in Whitmeyer (2019)
[33]. There are three types of sender; 휃퐿, 휃푀 , and 휃퐻 . A belief as a triple (휇퐿, 휇푀 , 휇퐻 ), and the
prior is (1/4, 1/4, 1/2).
This game is cheap talk with transparent motives: each sender type gets utility 1 if the
receiver chooses 푙 or 푠, and 0 if the receiver chooses 푥 . The receiver’s preferences are given
as follows:
Action 휃퐿 휃푀 휃퐻푙 0 1 2푠 13/24 13/24 1푥 1 0 1
Suppose that there are just two messages, 푔 and 푏. As we ascertain in Whitmeyer (2019)
[33], the receiver optimal equilibrium with full transparency is one in which 휃퐻 and 휃퐿 choose
dierent messages and 휃푀 mixes between those messages (푔 and 푏). The receiver’s payo is67/52. On the other hand, if we look for the receiver optimal equilibrium in which each type
chooses a pure strategy under any information structure, it is easy (though tedious) to verify
that the maximum payo the receiver can obtain is the pooling payo, 5/4 < 67/52. ■
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While this counterexample used three states, it is possible to construct a counterexample
with just two states and three actions. As the following result illustrates, a two state coun-
terexample would require that the game not be cheap talk, however. That is, in any cheap
talk game it is without loss of generality to restrict the sender types to pure strategies pro-
vided there are suciently many messages–in fact there is always an optimal transparency
solution in which they separate. This is extremely useful since it ensures that the receiver
need merely solve a linear program.
Proposition 2.5. In a cheap talk game, let the number of messages, 푡 , be weakly greater than
the number of states, 푛. Then, if the receiver can achieve some payo, 푣, under some informa-
tion structure and equilibrium, (휋 , 휎 ), then he can achieve that payo under some information
structure and equilibrium 휋̂ , 휎̂ where 휎̂ corresponds to a fully separating equilibrium.
Proof. Consider some arbitrary type 휃푖 . He must have푊 ∶= 푘∑푙=1 휋 (푎푙 |푚푎) 푢푆 (푎푙 , 휃푖) = 푘∑푙=1 휋 (푎푙 |푚푏) 푢푆 (푎푙 , 휃푖) (1)
for all 푚푎, 푚푏 in the support of his mixed strategy; and푊 = 푘∑푙=1 휋 (푎푙 |푚푎) 푢푆 (푎푙 , 휃푖) ≥ 푘∑푙=1 휋 (푎푙 |푚푐) 푢푆 (푎푙 , 휃푖) (2)
for all 푚푎 in the support of his mixed strategy, 휎푖 , and 푚푐 not in the support of his mixed
strategy. Next, dene 휎̂푖(푚푗) = 1 if 푗 = 푖 and 0 otherwise (each type is now separating), and
call this vector of strategies 휎̂ . Moreover, dene 휋̂ by휋̂ (푎푙 |푚푖) ∶= 푡∑푗=1 휎푖(푚푗)휋 (푎푙 |푚푗)
It is easy to verify via direct substitution that the receiver’s payo is the same and that the
obedience constraints are satised. It remains to verify that the IC constraints for the sender
types are satised. Observe that type 휃푖 , in choosing any 푚푑 obtains푘∑푙=1 휋̂ (푎푙 |푚푑 ) 푢푆 (푎푙 , 휃푖) = 푘∑푙=1 푡∑푗=1 휎푑 (푚푗)휋 (푎푙 |푚푗)푢푆 (푎푙 , 휃푖)= 푡∑푗=1 휎푑 (푚푗) 푘∑푙=1 휋 (푎푙 |푚푗)푢푆 (푎푙 , 휃푖)
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If 푑 = 푖 then this expression is푡∑푗=1 휎푖(푚푗) 푘∑푙=1 휋 (푎푙 |푚푗)푢푆 (푎푙 , 휃푖) = 푊
by the fact that 휎푖 was his previous equilibrium strategy and hence is nonzero only for mes-
sages which yield an expected payo of 푊 (see equation 1). If 푑 = 푟 ≠ 푖 then this expression
is 푡∑푗=1 휎푟 (푚푗) 푘∑푙=1 휋 (푎푙 |푚푗)푢푆 (푎푙 , 휃푖) ≤ 푊
since the highest expected payo any message can yield is푊 and since 휎푟 may place nonzero
probability on messages that yield the receiver an expected payo that is less than 푊 (see
inequality 2). ■
We end the section with the following result, which pertains to belief-based equilibrium
renements.
Lemma 2.6. Suppose (휎, 휌) is an equilibrium in the game with full transparency that is elim-
inated by some belief-based renement. Then, there exists a signal 휋 such that (휎, 휋 ) is an
equilibrium with 휋 = 휌 that is robust to any belief-based renement provided 휌 has full support
over 퐴; i.e. provided every action is played with positive probability.
Proof. Under full transparency suppose that there is some equilibrium under which message푚′ is not played with positive probability on the equilibrium path. Thus, there must be some
behavioral strategy 휌(푎|⋅) sustained by some belief 휇 such that no type can deviate to 푚′
protably. Suppose that there there is a belief-based equilibrium renement such that there
exists no 휇 that sustains such a 휌.
Introduce signal 휋 and suppose that every action 푎′ needed to head o a deviation is
played with positive probability on the equilibrium path. Then, simply choose 휋 such that
following a deviation to an o path 푚′, the signal 휋 (푎|푚) is such that the resulting distribu-
tions over actions is just the 휌(푎|푚′) needed to sustain the equilibrium.
If 휌 has full support over 퐴, the supposition in the previous paragraph obviously holds
(we’ve actually proved a slightly stronger result). ■
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3 Opacity = Commitment
In this section, we establish one of the two main results of the paper, that in simple com-
munication games in which the receiver has two actions, information design is as good as
commitment.
We begin with the following proposition, which states that any payo that the receiver
can obtain through information design, she can achieve with the ability to commit to mix-
tures over actions as a function of the sender’s message.
Proposition 3.1. If a receiver can achieve a payo at equilibrium under a particular informa-
tion structure, then the receiver can achieve that payo at equilibrium in a game in which ex
ante she commits to a distribution of actions conditioned on the sender’s message 푚.
Proof. Take any garbling, 휋 , of the message 푚, and the optimal response by the receiver to
this garbling. Every message, 푚, will lead to a distribution of actions by the receiver. The
same payo can be achieved by the receiver committing to the same distribution of actions
conditioned on each message, 푚. ■
Another way to deduce this result is to note that the receiver’s choice of commitment
strategy is a choice of mapping 휋 ∶ 푀 → Δ (퐴), and in her commitment problem she chooses휋 and 휎 to maximize 푛∑푖=1 휇0(휃푖) 푡∑푗=1 휎푖(푚푗) 푘∑푙=1 휋 (푎푙 |푚푗) 푢푅 (푚푗 , 푎푙 , 휃푖) (⋆)
such that 휎푖 ∈ argmax휎푖 { 푡∑푗=1 휎푖(푚푗) 푘∑푙=1 휋 (푎푙 |푚푗) 푢푆 (푚푗 , 푎푙 , 휃푖)} (퐼퐶푖)
for all 휃푖 , 푖 = 1,… , 푛. That is, her commitment problem is her information design problem
with the obedience constraints relaxed.
As the next result illustrates, the commitment problem is much easier to solve than the
information design problem, since it reduces to a nite collection of linear programs.
Lemma 3.2. There is a receiver-optimal equilibrium with commitment in which each type of
sender chooses a pure strategy.
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Proof. As noted above, in the receiver’s commitment problem, she maximizes ⋆ such that
constraints 퐼퐶푖 are satised for all types 휃푖 . Suppose that at the optimum there is a type
mixing, say 휃1. He must be indierent over each message in the support of his mixed strategy:
suppose that two such messages are 푚1 and 푚2. Then, since the receiver’s objective is linear
in 휎푖(푚푗) we have 휕푉휕휎1(푚1) = 휇0(휃1) 푘∑푙=1 휋 (푎푙 |푚1) 푢푅 (푚1, 푎푙 , 휃1) =∶ 휉휕푉휕휎1(푚2) = 휇0(휃1) 푘∑푙=1 휋 (푎푙 |푚2) 푢푅 (푚2, 푎푙 , 휃1) =∶ 휓
where 휉 and 휓 are constants. It is easy to see that we must have 휉 = 휓 since by construction푉 is being maximized. Hence, we may set either 휎1(푚1) or 휎1(푚2) to 0. We may do the
same with each other message in support of the mixed strategy until nally we arrive at one
message chosen with probability 1 and the rest with probability 0. The receiver’s payo is
unchanged and the sender is still unwilling to deviate. We may do likewise with each other
type 휃푖≠1, until each type is choosing a pure strategy. ■
One consequence of this result is that there is a commitment solution for the receiver in
which at most 푡 = |푀 | messages are used. Moreover, for a xed vector of pure strategies,
the receiver’s commitment problem is a linear program. Thus, the receiver’s commitment
problem is merely a nite collection of linear programming problems. Next, we use this
lemma to establish one of our main results.
Theorem 3.3 (Opacity Equals Commitment). Let |퐴| = 2. Then, in any simple signaling game,
the optimal transparency solution coincides with the commitment solution.
Proof. If the same action is optimal in every state then the proof is trivial. Hence suppose
that each action is strictly optimal in at least one state. Let the number of actions, 푘 = 2, and
for simplicity write 푣푖 ∶= 푢푅 (푎1, 휃푖), 푤푖 ∶= 푢푅 (푎2, 휃푖), 휋푗 ∶= 휋 (푎1|푚푗), and 1 − 휋푗 ∶= 휋 (푎2|푚푗).
Next, observe that the payo upon observing nothing for the receiver (i.e. should she
simply choose her optimal action based on the prior) is푉̂ = max{ 푛∑푖=1 휇0 (휃푖) 푣푖 , 푛∑푖=1 휇0 (휃푖)푤푖}
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From Lemma 3.2, in searching for the optimal commitment solution it is without loss to
restrict our search to those in which each type of sender chooses a pure strategy. Hence, in
the obedience constraint, we may reduce ∑푡푗=1 휎푖(푚푗)휋푗 to just 휋푖 and ∑푡푗=1 휎푖(푚푗) (1 − 휋푗) =1 − 휋푖 . Thus, in the optimal commitment solution, the receiver’s payo may be rewritten as푛∑푖=1 휇0(휃푖) [휋푖푣푖 + (1 − 휋푖)푤푖]
and the obedience constraints that must be satised are푛∑푖=1 휇0 (휃푖) 푣푖휋푖 ≥ 푛∑푖=1 휇0 (휃푖)푤푖휋푖 (푂1)푛∑푖=1 휇0 (휃푖)푤푖 (1 − 휋푖) ≥ 푛∑푖=1 휇0 (휃푖) 푣푖 (1 − 휋푖) (푂2)
Suppose rst that the receiver chooses each action with positive probability on path (and
so Bayes’ law in the obedience constraints is dened). Moreover, without loss of generality,
let 푉̂ = ∑푛푖=1 휇0 (휃푖) 푣푖 , i.e. ∑푛푖=1 휇0 (휃푖) 푣푖 ≥ ∑푛푖=1 휇0 (휃푖)푤푖: should she observe nothing, the
receiver weakly prefers action 푎1. Consequently, the rst obedience constraint must be slack
and we must also have
푛∑푖=1 휇0(휃푖) [휋푖푣푖 + (1 − 휋푖)푤푖] ≥ 푛∑푖=1 휇0 (휃푖) 푣푖
or 푛∑푖=1 휇0 (휃푖)푤푖 (1 − 휋푖) ≥ 푛∑푖=1 휇0 (휃푖) 푣푖 (1 − 휋푖)
and thus the obedience constraints are satised.
Second, suppose that the receiver does not choose each action with positive probability
on path, and without loss of generality let ∑푛푖=1 휇0 (휃푖) 푣푖 ≥ ∑푛푖=1 휇0 (휃푖)푤푖 . Then, it is clear
that the receiver must be told to play action 1 and so Bayes’ law used to derive the second
obedience constraint must not be dened. Since there is at least one state in which the
second action is optimal, we can always stipulate an o path belief such that constraint 푂2
is satised. Finally, by construction the rst obedience constraint is satised. ■
This result allows us to solve for the optimal degree of transparency in any 2 action simple
game with ease. We need simply solve the receiver’s commitment problem, which consists
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of at most two signal realizations. Moreover, thanks to Lemma 3.2, this problem can itself be
reduced–it suces to merely consider the cases in which the dierent types of sender choose
pure strategies.
3.1 The Optimal Signal in the Intra-rm Example
Here we solve for the optimal information structure given in the introductory example, so
as to illustrate the usefulness of the above results. Armed with Theorem 3.3, our problem
is simple: we need only solve the receiver’s commitment problem. Since the receiver has
just two actions, we can describe her commitment strategy with just two variables, 푝, and 푞,
where 푝 ∶= 휋 (퐶 |퐼 ), and 푞 ∶= 휋 (퐶 |푁 )
Namely, the COO commits to close the branch with probability 푝 following message 퐼 , and
with probability 푞 following message 푁 .
Next, from Lemma 3.2 we need only search for the optimum for the cases in which the
sender in each state chooses a pure strategy. First, suppose that the sender in the good state
chooses 퐼 and that the sender in the bad state chooses 푁 .
The receiver’s objective function ismax푝,푞 {휇0 [1 − 푝] + (1 − 휇0)푞}
and the two incentive compatibility constraints for the sender (in each state) are:푝 + 3(1 − 푝) ≥ 2(1 − 푞) (푆1)푞 + 3(1 − 푞) ≥ 2(1 − 푝) (푆2)
It is clear that only the second constraint binds and so the optimal 푝 and 푞 are 푝 = 1/2 and푞 = 1 for 휇0 ≤ 1/2 and 푝 = 0 and 푞 = 1/2 for 휇0 ≥ 1/2. These yield payos to the receiver of1 − 휇0/2 and (1 + 휇0)/2, respectively.
This commitment equilibrium is obviously better for the receiver than a commitment
equilibrium in which the sender chooses the same message regardless of the state (such an
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equilibrium begets the pooling payo). Likewise, it is easy to verify that there is no com-
mitment equilibrium in which the senders separate in the opposite manner. Thus, this com-
mitment equilibrium is optimal and by Theorem 3.3, opacity equals commitment, and so the
receiver’s commitment strategy corresponds to the optimal information structure.
Explicitly, the optimal information signal consists of two signal realizations, 푋 = {푐, 표}
(recommendations “close" and “keep open," respectively), and mapping 휋 ∶ 푀 → Δ(푋 ),
where 휋 (푐|푁 ) = 1, 휋 (푐|퐼 ) = 12휋 (표|푁 ) = 0, 휋 (표|퐼 ) = 12
for 휇0 ≤ 1/2, and 휋 (푐|푁 ) = 12 , 휋 (푐|퐼 ) = 0휋 (표|푁 ) = 12 , 휋 (표|퐼 ) = 1
for 휇0 ≥ 1/2.
3.2 Robustness of Opacity = Commitment
Naturally, there are many games that fall under the umbrella of communication games that
nevertheless cannot be termed simple. That is, while information transmission is a key com-
ponent of such games, the receiver has preferences over the messages themselves as well.
Here we provide a generalization of Theorem 3.3.
There are 푛 states and 푡 messages, indexed by 푖 and 푗, respectively. The receiver has two
actions, 푎1 and 푎2, and for convenience we write the receiver’s utilities from the two actions
and 푡 messages as 푣푖푗 ∶= 푢(푎1, 휃푖 , 푚푗) and 푤 푖푗 ∶= 푢(푎2, 휃푖 , 푚푗). We introduce the following
condition.
Condition 3.4. For any state 휃푖 , 푣푖1 ≥ max푗 {푣푖푗} and 푤 푖1 ≥ max푗 {푤 푖푗}.
This condition has a straightforward meaning. Simply, the receiver has a “favorite" mes-
sage, which, all else equal, she prefers that the sender choose. Such a condition is natural
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in many contexts. One such instance is in the Sir Philip Sidney game, the topic of Whit-
meyer (2019) [34]. There, the relatedness parameter, 푘, ensures that the game is not simple.
However, Condition 3.4 is satised: regardless of the state the receiver would prefer that the
sender remain silent.
Indeed, in many settings, a stronger condition holds; that 푣푖1 ≥ 푣푖2 ≥ ⋯ ≥ 푣푖푛 and 푤 푖1 ≥푤 푖2 ≥ ⋯ ≥ 푤 푖푛. This corresponds to a scenario in which, all else equal, the receiver has the
same preferences over the message chosen by the sender. The political example included
later on in this paper satises this strong condition (and thus also Condition 3.4). There,
irrespective of whether the incumbent is good or bad, the receiver prefers that he choose the
lowest amount of policy frictions.
Yet another instance of a game where this strong condition is natural is a version of the
Spence (1978) [31] education model in which education enhances productivity. There, we
might suppose that regardless of the state, the employer would prefer that the worker have
more education. Of course, all simple signaling games satisfy the strong condition.
Proposition 3.5 (Opacity Equals Commitment II). Let Condition 3.4 hold. Then, if absent
strategic concerns, each sender type prefers message 푚1, the optimal transparency solution co-
incides with the commitment solution.
Proof. The proof is analogous to that for Theorem 3.3 and so is left to Appendix A.1. ■
Although Proposition 3.5 allows us to extend Theorem 3.3 beyond simple signaling games,
it has a number of conditions as prerequisites. These assumptions are not innocuous, and
without them, the result may fail. It is easy to see that in general for non-simple games, the
receiver may benet if she had the ability to commit to an incredible threat. Indeed, consider
the following modication of the Spence (1978) [31] signaling model. The receiver is a rm
with a binary decision: whether to hire an applicant. The applicant is the sender, who can
choose his level of education, but education is costly and all else equal less education is better
for each type.
Suppose that the game is non-simple: education is productivity-enhancing; and, regard-
less of the applicant’s type, a more educated worker is better for the rm. Finally, suppose
that no matter the type or the level of education, the rm would prefer to hire the worker.
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Thus, with the ability to commit to actions, the rm might want to commit to only hire
workers with a suciently high level of education, yet such a protocol would not be sequen-
tially rational: no signal would persuade the rm to follow through on such a threat. Hence,
commitment is strictly better than opacity.
In addition, Theorem 3.3 is robust. Namely, if we perturb the receiver’s preferences so
that she has slight preferences over the message chosen by the sender, the opacity equals
commitment equivalence remains, provided in the unperturbed game, the receiver can obtain
a payo that is strictly higher than the pooling payo (the payo should there be no strategic
interaction in which the receiver simply took the action optimal under the prior). To wit,
Proposition 3.6. Consider any two action, simple, signaling game in which each action is
strictly optimal in at least one state, and in which the receiver can obtain a payo that is strictly
higher than the pooling payo. Then for any non-simple perturbation of this game in which
the receiver’s payos are suciently close to her payos in the unperturbed game, opacity is as
good as commitment.
Proof. We prove the following formal result. Consider any two action, simple, signaling game
with payos denoted by 푣푖 ∶= 푢푅(푎1, 휃푖) and 푤푖 ∶= 푢푅(푎2, 휃푖); and let there exist some 휃푖 such
that 푣푖 > 푤푖 and some 휃푘 such that 푤푘 > 푣푘 . Moreover, let푉 > 푛∑푖=1 휇0 (휃푖) 푣푖 , and 푉 > 푛∑푖=1 휇0 (휃푖)푤푖
In any non-simple perturbation of this game, with 푢푅(푎1, 푚푗 , 휃푖) = 푣푖 + 휔(푎1, 푚푗 , 휃푖) and푢푅(푎2, 푚푗 , 휃푖) = 푤푖+휔(푎2, 푚푗 , 휃푖), there exists a 휅 > 0 such that if |휔(푎푙 , 푚푗 , 휃푖)| ≤ 휅 for all 푎푙 ∈ 퐴,
for all 푚푗 ∈ 푀 and for all 휃푖 ∈ Θ, the solution to the receiver’s commitment problem satises
her obedience constraints. Viz, opacity equals commitment.
The proof may be found in Appendix A.2. ■
Alas, if the receiver has three or more actions then Theorem 3.3 may fail to hold. Consider
the modied game depicted in Figure 4. This is a version of the Beer-Quiche game of Cho
and Kreps (1987) [9] with the addition of action ℎ for the receiver. As this game illustrates,
our previous result (Theorem 3.3) cannot be extended to the case in which the receiver has
three actions.
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휃푊(4, 1/2) ℎ(0, 1) 푓
(4, 0) 푛푓
퐵
(6, 0)푛푓
(1, 1)푓
(6, 1/2)ℎ푄
1 − 휇0
휃푆
(1, 1/2) ℎ(1, 0) 푓(6, 1) 푛푓
퐵
(4, 1)푛푓
(0, 0)푓
(0, 1/2)ℎ푄휇0
푅 푅
Figure 4: A 3 Action Game
Recall the Beer-Quiche game: there are two types, wimp (휃푊 ) and strong (휃푆). In the
original formulation, there are just two actions for the receiver: it is a basic match-the-state
game in which the receiver obtains a payo of 1 from ghting the wimp or not ghting the
strong type, and 0 otherwise. Now, the receiver gets a payo of 1/2 from choosing ℎ no matter
the state. As for the sender, in the original setting, wimps prefer Quiche to Beer and vice-
versa for the strong types. In addition, both types prefer not being fought to being fought,
and crucially, they would rather have their least favorite meal and not be fought than have
their favorite meal and be fought. These preferences continue to hold in the modication;
and there, ℎ yields the same payo to the wimp as 푛푓 , and ℎ yields the same payo to the
strong type as 푓 .
Throughout this example, we assume that 휇0 > 1/2. For completeness, we leave detailed
analysis to Appendix A.3. There, we derive that in the commitment solution the senders
separate: type 휃푊 chooses 푄 and type 휃푆 chooses 퐵. After 퐵, the receiver chooses 푛푓 with
probability 1; and after 푄, the receiver chooses 푓 with probability 2/5 and ℎ with probability3/5.
However, in the transparency problem, it is immediately clear that given the correspond-
ing direct signal realization, “play ℎ”, the obedience constraint for the receiver will be satised
only if her belief given the signal is that the sender is the wimp with probability 1/2. Instead,
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she believes that the sender is the wimp with probability 1, and so the optimal commitment
strategy is not sequentially rational.
4 The Structure of Optimal Transparency and the Re-
wards to Ex Ante Learning
We begin this section by revisiting the introductory example involving intra-rm commu-
nication. Suppose that prior to the communication game the COO has a chance to acquire
public information. She may for instance commission an independent report, or even visit
the local branch herself. Is it true that, given this opportunity, the COO would always choose
to take it? That is, would any ex ante information acquisition benet the COO? Observe that
an equivalent question is whether the COO’s payo as a function of the (prior) belief in the
signaling game is convex in the prior.
The companion paper to this one, Whitmeyer (2019) [33] looks at a general version of
this question when the receiver is restricted to full transparency. As we discover there, for
two state, two action simple communication games like the intra-rm example, the answer
is yes. But what if the COO may choose the optimal degree of transparency in the ensuing
communication game?
We denote the receiver’s payo with optimal transparency as a function of the prior푉 = 푉 (휇),6 and denote the receiver’s payo with full transparency as 푉 푇 = 푉 푇 (휇).
It is straightforward to verify that 푉 and 푉 푇 are
푉 (휇) = ⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩1 −
휇2 휇 ≤ 121+휇2 휇 ≥ 12 , and 푉 푇 (휇) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩1 − 휇 휇 ≤
12휇 휇 ≥ 12
These two functions are depicted in Figure 5, and are clearly convex. Hence, regardless of
whether the COO can choose the optimal signal, ex ante learning is always (at least weakly)
benecial.
6Note that until now, we have referred to the prior belief as 휇0. Henceforth, 휇0 will denote the prior belief
before ex ante learning, and we denote the prior belief in the communication game by 휇 (which is the posterior
belief resulting from the initial fact nding).
28
Figure 5: Optimal Transparency and Full Transparency Payos, Intra-Firm Example
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However, is this true more generally with optimal transparency? As we will see shortly,
in simple two action games, then ex ante information acquisition is always good, provided
the receiver can choose the information structure in the ensuing game. If she cannot, then
Theorem 4.1. in Whitmeyer (2019) [33] states that information up front may actually hurt
the receiver. That is, there is information that she would refuse, even if it was free.
Formally, we model ex ante information acquisition or fact-nding as follows. Fix a simple
communication game, and suppose that prior to participating the game, the receiver may
acquire information, which is public. That is, initially the receiver and the sender share
some prior, 휇0, and there is some nite (or at least compact) set of signal realizations 푌 and
a signal or Blackwell experiment, mapping 휁 ∶ Θ → Δ(푌 ) whose realization is public.
This experiment leads to a distribution over posteriors, where the posterior following signal
realization 푦 is 휇푦 . Following the realization of the experiment, the sender and receiver then
take part in the signaling game, where the common prior for the game is 휇푦 . Call 휁 the Initial
Experiment.
Example 4.1. Next, we revisit the example from Lemma 4.2 in Whitmeyer (2019) [33] to
show how information design ensures a positive value of information to the receiver in a
game where information may have a negative value with full transparency. There are four
states, Θ = {휃1, 휃2, 휃3, 휃4}, and a belief is a quadruple (휇1, 휇2, 휇3, 휇4), where 휇푖 ∶= Pr (Θ = 휃푖) for
all 푖 = 1, 2, 3, 4 and 휇1 + 휇2 + 휇3 + 휇4 = 1.
The belief can be fully described with just three variables; hence, depicting the receiver’s
payo as a function of the belief requires four dimensions. The current medium of this
paper renders this impossible, so instead we restrict attention to a family of experiments
that involve learning on just one dimension. That is, we x 휇1 = 1/3 and 휇3 = 1/8, and
consider only the receiver’s payo as a function of her (prior) belief about states 휃2 and 휃4.
Learning is on just one dimension, and so (abusing notation) we rewrite the receiver’s belief휇2 as 휇 and 휇4 as 13/24 − 휇, where 휇 ∈ [0, 13/24].
In states 휃1 and 휃2, action 푎2 is the correct action for the receiver; and in states 휃3 and 휃4,
action 푎1 is correct:
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Action 휃1 휃2 휃3 휃4푎1 0 0 1 2푎2 1 1 0 0
Likewise, the sender’s state (type)-dependent payos from message, action pairs are
given as follows:
type 휃1 휃2 휃3 휃4
message 푚1 푚2 푚3 푚1 푚2 푚3 푚1 푚2 푚3 푚1 푚2 푚3푎1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 3 −1 2 −2푎2 1 0 0 0 1 0 2 4 0 5/4 0 −1
Note that types 휃1 and 휃2 have messages that are strictly dominant (푚1 and 푚2, respec-
tively), and that 휃4 has a message that is strictly dominated (푚3).
In Figure 6 we depict the receiver’s equilibrium payo as a function of 휇 with both full
transparency (푉 푇 ) and optimal transparency (푉 ). Explicitly, those functions are
푉 (휇) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
3724 − 2휇 휇 ≤ 13365972 1336 ≤ 휇 ≤ 357213 + 휇 3572 ≤ 휇 ≤ 1324 , and 푉 푇 (휇) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
3724 − 2휇 휇 ≤ 133613 + 휇 1336 < 휇 ≤ 1324
where 푉 푇 was derived in Lemma 4.2 of Whitmeyer (2019) [33]. By Theorem 3.3, to obtain푉 we need only solve the commitment problem. Thus, its derivation reduces to a simple
(though tedious) linear program, which is omitted.
As Figure 6 illustrates, the issue engendered by ex ante learning–that the resulting belief
may beget a strictly worse equilibrium in the communication game–is ameliorated if the
receiver can choose the optimal information structure. Thus, in the example, the receiver’s
payo with optimal transparency is convex. There, information design ensures that ex ante
information acquisition is always helpful.
This result is general, and holds for all simple games with two actions. First, we establish
that commitment guarantees a positive value of information in any communication game.
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Figure 6: Optimal Transparency and Full Transparency Payos, Non-convex Counterexam-
ple
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Lemma 4.2. In the commitment problem, the receiver’s payo under the optimal commitment
strategy is convex in the prior 휇.
Proof. The proof is left to Appendix B.1. ■
Second, Theorem 3.3 and Lemma 4.2 combine to yield
Theorem 4.3. In simple games, if the receiver has two actions, then the receiver’s payo with
optimal transparency is convex in the prior 휇.
This result is striking: in simple binary action games, optimal transparency guarantees
that the value of information is always positive, even though with full transparency the
value of information may be negative. Unfortunately, as the next result illustrates, with
three or more states and actions ex ante information acquisition is not always benecial for
the receiver, even with optimal transparency.
Proposition 4.4. If there are at least three states, three actions and two messages then the
receiver’s payo is not generally convex in the prior.
Proof. Proof is via counterexample. We revisit the game from Proposition 2.4 from this paper,
which itself was taken from Lemma 4.3 in Whitmeyer (2019) [33].
We endow the sender types with access to three messages (푔, 푚, and 푏), and remind
ourselves that this game is cheap talk with transparent motives, where the sender gets 1 from푙 or 푠 and 0 from 푥 , no matter his type or message choice. The prior is 휇0 and learning consists
of a binary initial experiment that results in the beliefs 휇1 and 휇2, each with probability 1/2.
Explicitly, 휇0 ∶= (14 , 14 , 12) , 휇1 ∶= ( 112 , 14 , 23) , and 휇2 ∶= ( 512 , 14 , 13)
By Proposition 2.5, since there are three messages it is without loss to restrict attention to
equilibria in which the sender types separate in the optimal transparency solution. We solve
the resulting linear program and obtain that the receiver’s maximal payos are 67/52 and83/52 at beliefs 휇0 and 휇1, respectively; and 127/132 at belief 휇2. Comparing the receiver’s
payo at 휇0 to her expected payo resulting from the initial experiment 휁–6752 > 21951716 = 12 ⋅ 8352 + 12 ⋅ 127132
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–we see that this information strictly lowers the receiver’s payo.
If the receiver has commitment power, then her commitment solution is one in which 휃퐿
separates and chooses 푚, and 휃푀 and 휃퐻 pool on 푔. The receiver commits to choosing 푠 after푚, 푙 after 푔, and 푥 after 푏, and her payo is 133/96 at 휇0, which equals her expected payo
with learning, 12 × 469288 + 12 × 329288
Thus, as we learned from Lemma 4.2, commitment ensures that information cannot hurt the
receiver.
It’s clear that this commitment solution is not sequentially rational: after being instructed
to choose 푠, the receiver strictly prefers to choose 푥 since she knows the sender is 휃퐿. Hence,
we have stumbled upon another illustration that when the number of actions is three or
greater, opacity ≠ commitment.
Finally, Figure 7 depicts the receiver’s posteriors resulting from the receiver-optimal equi-
libria at each belief, both when the receiver can choose the optimal degree of transparency (in
black) and when the receiver has commitment power (in green). Each 푥 denotes a posterior
distribution. ■
5 Examples
Here, we illustrate the earlier results through three examples. In the rst, we explore the
decision of an investor choosing whether to invest in a rm with uncertain potential. In the
second, we analyze a regime change problem, where a populace must choose whether to
replace a possibly bad incumbent. In the third, we explore the problem of a hiring school at
the American Economic Association academic job market. All three examples suggest dif-
ferent interpretations of the signal 휋 . In the investment example, 휋 could be disclosure rules
and regulations, or due diligence insisted upon by the investor. Conversely, in the political
example, 휋 could be the reporting actions of the free press. In the job market example, 휋
could be an email lter.
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Figure 7: Proposition 4.4 Optimal Posteriors
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5.1 Benchmarks and Disclosure Rules
The receiver is a prospective investor who is choosing whether to purchase a rm, whose
CEO is the sender. The CEO has private information, the viability of the rm: with probabil-
ity 훾 the rm’s future cash ow will be high, and with probability 1−훾 the rm’s future cash
ow will be low. A high cash ow delivers the receiver an income stream of 1 in perpetuity,
and a low cash ow delivers the receiver a perpetual stream of 0.
Hence, the sender’s type is the probability 훾 that the project is viable. Suppose that there
are just three possible types, Γ ∶= {3/10, 3/5, 9/10}, and that both sender and receiver share
a common prior that each type is realized with probability 1/3. The receiver discounts the
future by 훿 = 9/10.
The posted price for the project is 7, and if the receiver buys the company with viability훾 her expected payo is 훾1 − 훿 − 7
Hence the receiver will buy only if 피[훾 ]1 − 훿 − 7 ≥ 0
or 피[훾 ] ≥ 710
The CEO receives a lump sum payo of 3/5 in the event that the company is bought, and 0
otherwise.
There is a signaling component to this interaction: prior to the purchasing decision of the
receiver, the CEO must choose how much of a budget of 1 to allocate between a risky venture
and a safe venture. The safe venture repays the amount invested of 푠 with probability 1, and
the risky venture repays double the amount invested 푟 with probability 훾 and repays 0 with
probability 1−훾 . Thus, the short term protability of the risky venture is perfectly correlated
with the likelihood that the rm will have a high future cash ow.
With regard to the short-run risky venture, the CEO is risk averse and his utility over his
terminal wealth is 푢(푤) = √푤 . Overall, given an investment of 푟 in the risky venture and
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1 − 푟 in the safe venture, the CEO’s utility from the scenario is푢푆 = 훾√1 − 푟 + 2푟 + (1 − 훾 )√1 − 푟 + 35
if the receiver buys the rm and푢푆 = 훾√1 − 푟 + 2푟 + (1 − 훾 )√1 − 푟
if the receiver does not buy the rm.
Here is a synopsis of the scenario’s timing: rst, the state 훾 is drawn uniformly fromΓ and revealed to the sender; second, the sender chooses a short term investment level 푟 ,
which is observed by the receiver; third, the receiver decides whether to purchase the rm,
and then payos are realized.
Absent strategic concerns, the CEO’s short run investment strategy is simple. If 훾 = 3/10,
he chooses 푟 = 0; if 훾 = 3/5, he chooses 푟 = 5/13; and if 훾 = 9/10, he chooses 푟 = 40/41.
However, such separation does not beget an equilibrium in the game with full transparency.
Both types 3/10 and 3/5 would prefer to deviate and mimic type 9/10.
Indeed, it is easy to see that there can be no equilibrium in this game with full trans-
parency in which there are messages7 chosen after which the receiver strictly prefers dif-
ferent actions. For that to be the case, at least one of type 3/10 or 3/5 must have some sup-
port of his mixed strategy on a message that is followed by the decision to not buy. How-
ever, then that type would deviate protably to the message that is followed by the decision
to buy. Consequently, the best payo the receiver can obtain is the pooling payo. Since피[훾 ] = 3/5 < 7/10 the receiver’s payo is 0.
Now consider the commitment problem in which the receiver can choose a mapping휋 ∶ 푀 → Δ {푏푢푦, 푛표푡}. We obtain that the optimal equilibrium is one in which each type of
sender separates: type 3/10 chooses 0, type 3/5 chooses 40/41, and type 9/10 chooses 1. One
signal that engenders such an equilibrium is휋 (푏푢푦 ||||4041) = 53 − 173√41 ≈ .78, 휋 (푏푢푦 |1) = 53 − √2 + 4√41 ≈ .88,
and 휋 (푏푢푦 |푟) = 0, ∀푟 ≠ 4041 , 1
7Recall that we refer to the sender’s action as a message–here the investment level, 푟 , is his message.
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which yields a payo of .03 ≈ 5 − 6√2 + √4190 > 0
For a detailed derivation of the solution see Appendix C.1. From Theorem 3.3, opacity equals
commitment, and hence this is the optimal information structure.
Note that there are several curious properties of the optimal signal and equilibrium. First,
both types 3/5 and 9/10 are forced to over-invest in the signaling stage, in order to negate
a protable deviation from the lowest type (which is the type that the prospective buyer
really does not want to purchase). Second, the information is coarsened by the signal: now
the signal occasionally provides both false positives and false negatives, so as to optimally
incentive the low types.
We can interpret 휋 literally as a combination of a benchmark and a disclosure rule (or an
accounting rule). The investor can design a protocol so that if the required investment level(s)
are not met, she will observe a signal realization instructing her to refrain from buying. Even
if the benchmark (the required investment levels) are met, then the accounting rule is such
that she is still occasionally instructed to not buy.
One way this could be implemented, for instance, is via an online form that initially asks
the CEO (or his team of accountants) explicitly whether the rm has either a) invested 40/41
or 1, or b) anything else (where truthfulness could be legally enforced). Then, provided an
answer of a) to the rst question the form would ask a follow-up question 10 percent of the
time asking the sender to state whether he invested 40/41 or 1. There, if 40/41was answered,
the rm would be agged as 푏푎푑 and if 1 was answered, the rm would be rated 푒푥푐푒푙푙푒푛푡 .
The remaining 90 percent of the time, no additional question would be asked and con-
ditional on no additional question being asked, the rm would be assessed as 푒푥푐푒푙푙푒푛푡 85
percent of the time, and 푏푎푑 otherwise. If b) were answered to the initial question then the
rm would be agged as 푏푎푑 . Finally, the prospective investor would invest following an푒푥푐푒푙푙푒푛푡 rating, but not following 푏푎푑 .
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5.2 A Free Press that Censors
Publicity is justly commended as a remedy for social and industrial
diseases. Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants.
Justice Louis Brandeis
Next, we apply the ideas promulgated earlier to a basic regime change game in the spirit
of Angeletos, Hellwig and Pavan (2006) [1]. There is an incumbent in power whose type
is a (real-valued) binary random variable 푋 , which takes values in the set {푥푔 , 푥푏}, corre-
sponding to “good" and “bad", respectively. We impose that 푥푔 > 1 > 푥푏. There is single
representative receiver–a median voter.8 The incumbent’s type is private information and
the receiver’s prior belief about the incumbent’s type, 휇0 ∶= Pr(푋 = 푥푏), is correct and is
common knowledge.
The incumbent chooses 푟 ∈ [푟̄ , 푟̄] ⊂ (0, 1) which corresponds to the amount of (policy)
frictions that impede regime change. That is, the higher 푟 the more costly it is for the receiver
to attack the regime. Note that 푟 is directly payo relevant for the receiver: the game is not
simple.
There is news in this model: there is a binary signal 푠 ∈ {퐺, 퐵}, where 푏 ∶= Pr(퐵|푥푏), and푔 ∶= Pr(퐵|푥푔). We suppose that the situation is one of “perfect bad news": 1 > 푏 > 푔 = 0. That
is, bad news will never arise for a good incumbent. Formally, the receiver’s set of messages
is 푀 ∶= [푟̄ , 푟̄] × {퐺, 퐵}.9
The game proceeds as follows: rst, the incumbent chooses 푟 ; second, signal 푠 is gener-
ated and the receiver observes both 푠 and 푟 before choosing action 푎 ∈ {0, 1}, corresponding
to “not attack" or “attack" the regime, respectively; and third, the incumbent observes the
8Angeletos, Hellwig and Pavan (2006) [1], as do many other papers that look at games of regime change,
model the scenario as a global game. Of course, arguably the most compelling aspect of a global game is the
coordination problem faced by the populace. However, here this issue is moot: the mapping 휋 eliminates
possible coordination problems; and moreover, we are searching for the optimal equilibrium for the receiver.
9Note that in the proof of Theorem 3.3 the realized message was a deterministic outcome of the receiver’s
choice. Here, the realized message is a random outcome of the receiver’s choice. Nevertheless, it is simple
to verify that the result continues to hold–this more general formulation was not included in the paper since
it adds cumbersome notation and is analogous to the simpler, more concise, version that this paper contains
instead.
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choice of the receiver and chooses a regime outcome, 푑 ∈ {0, 1}. The incumbent’s utility
function is
푈퐼 = (1 − 푑)(푥 − 푎) − 푟
If the incumbent is bad, an attack will be successful and the incumbent will choose 푑 = 0.
Conversely, if an incumbent is good, an attack will never be successful, though it will be
costly. The receiver’s payos are straightforward: if an attack is successful, the receiver
obtains payo 1 − 푟 and if an attack is unsuccessful, the receiver obtains payo −푟 . If the
receiver does not attack, she gets 0.
We impose that 푥푏 > 푟̄ − 푟̄ and that 푏 satises푏 < 푥푏 − (푟̄ − 푟̄)푥푏
i.e. that 푟̄ − 푟̄ < 푥푏(1 −푏), which two conditions ensure that there are no separating equilibria.
Indeed, suppose there is such an equilibrium, in which type 푥푏 chooses some 푟 and type 푥푏
chooses some 푟 ′ ≠ 푟 . Type 푥푏’s incentive constraint reduces to 푟 ′ − 푟 ≥ 푥푏, which is never
satised under our imposition. We also impose that
휇0(1 − 푏)(1 − 푟̄) + (1 − 휇0)(−푟̄) < 0 (3)
which ensures that there is a pooling equilibrium in which both types of incumbent pool on푟̄ . Indeed, in such an equilibrium, following news 퐵, the receiver will attack, and following
news 퐺, the receiver will not attack. It is easy to see; moreover, that this is the equilibrium
that maximizes the receiver’s payo, and she obtains 푉 = 푏(1 − 푟̄).
On the other hand, the receiver’s commitment solution, and hence the optimal degree of
transparency (via Theorem 3.3) is given by the direct signal 휋 ∶ 푀 → Δ {0, 1}, where
휋 (1|(푟̄ , 퐺)) = 0, 휋 (1|(푟̄ , 퐺)) = 푟̄ − 푟̄푥푏(1 − 푏) ,
and 휋 (1|(푚, 푠)) = 1, ∀(푟 , 푠) ≠ (푟̄ , 퐺), (푟̄ , 퐺)
In the receiver-optimal equilibrium under this degree of transparency the senders separate:
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sender 푥푏 chooses 푟̄ and sender 푥푔 chooses 푟̄ . The full derivation is contained in Appendix
C.2.
In this setting, one natural interpretation of the signal 휋 is as the actions or reporting of
the “free press". That is, the specic 휋 described above can be viewed in general as particular
equilibrium play by a neutral mediator, which in the political setting naturally corresponds
to the neutral press. Such a press observes the level of frictions chosen by the sender (푟 ) and
a news event (퐺 or 퐵) and then reports on those two things to the populace.
Hence, in this scenario, the populace is better o if the press occasionally obfuscates.
With all due respect to Justice Brandeis, sunlight may not be the best disinfectant (at least
in general). Occasionally, even though the incumbent has done something that only a bad
incumbent would do (chosen 푟̄ ), the free press should give him a pass and not report it to the
populace.
5.3 Filtering Emails
The American Economic Association (AEA) has a mechanism for the academic job market
in which each job market candidate can select up to two schools to designate as recipients
of a “signal" (henceforth a “wave", in order to keep things clear) expressing the candidate’s
interest in being interviewed at the Allied Social Science Associations (ASSA) meetings in
January. We explore a simplied version of this problem.
In order to avoid the problem of waving to multiple receivers, a scenario beyond the scope
of this paper, we suppose that there is just a single school, and one candidate with a single
wave at his access. The candidate has a type, random variable Θ, which takes values in the
unit interval, [0, 1]. Both school and the candidate share a common prior over the candidate’s
type, which has full support on [0, 1] and is distributed according to absolutely continuous
cdf 퐹 (휃) ∶= Pr (Θ ≤ 휃).
The school’s decision is binary: interview the candidate (푖) or not (푛). The school obtains
a payo of 휃 if they interview a candidate with type Θ = 휃 , and the school has an outside
option 푑 ∈ (0, 1). The candidate has value 푥(휃) of being interviewed by the school where푥 ∶ Θ → [0, 1] is increasing and twice continuously dierentiable on [0, 1]. Moreover,
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푥(0) = 0 and 푥(1) = 1.
The candidate has a simple choice as well: wave to the school (푤) or not (푟 ). There is a
cost 푘 ∈ (0, 1) to the candidate of waving to the school–think of this as an opportunity cost:
if the candidate waves to this school, he10 cannot wave to another.
We search for the commitment solution. By Lemma 3.2 we may restrict the candidate
types to pure strategies. Moreover, we can fully describe the commitment strategy, 휋 , with
variables 푝 and 푞 where 푝 ∶= 휋 (푖|푤), and 푞 ∶= 휋 (푖|푟)
Let’s look for an equilibrium in which positive measures of types choose each message (re-
member, the sender’s message is a choice of wave or not). All types 휃 who choose 푤 have
the following IC constraint:
푝푥(휃) ≥ 푞푥(휃) + 푘
Hence, we must have 푝 > 푞. Rearranging this, we have(푝 − 푞) 푥(휃) ≥ 푘
Likewise, all types 휃 ′ who choose 푟 have the following IC constraint(푝 − 푞) 푥(휃 ′) ≤ 푘
Claim 5.1. If there is an equilibrium in which some type 휃̂ chooses 푤 and some type 휃† chooses푟 , then all 휃 ≥ 휃̂ must choose 푤 and all 휃 ≤ 휃† must choose 푟 .
Proof. Let type 휃̂ choose 푤 , and let 휃 be any type strictly greater than 휃̂ . Then, we have(푝 − 푞) 푥(휃) > (푝 − 푞) 푥(휃̂) ≥ 푘
since 푥(⋅) is increasing and 푝 − 푞 > 0. Hence, 휃 must choose 푤 . The analogous procedure
suces for types that are choosing 푟 . ■
10Remember, in this paper, sender types are male and the receiver is female.
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Consequently, if there is an equilibrium in which positive measures of types choose dif-
ferent messages then there must be some threshold value 휃̂ ; where all 휃 < 휃̂ choose 푟 , all휃 > 휃̂ choose 푤 , and 휃̂ himself is indierent. Note that because 푘 > 0, there must always
be some positive measure of types in equilibrium who strictly prefer and hence choose 푟 , no
matter the signal. The receiver’s payo is푉 = ∫ 휃̂0 (푞휃 + (1 − 푞)푑) 푑퐹 (휃) + ∫ 1휃̂ (푝휃 + (1 − 푝)푑) 푑퐹 (휃)
and the IC constraints are (푝 − 푞) 푥(휃) ≤ 푘
for all 휃 < 휃̂ , and (푝 − 푞) 푥(휃) ≥ 푘
for all 휃 > 휃̂ . The receiver’s payo can be rewritten as푉 = 푞 ∫ 휃̂0 (휃 − 푑) 푑퐹 (휃) + 푝 ∫ 1휃̂ (휃 − 푑) 푑퐹 (휃) + 푑
Because the IC constraint of type 휃̂ must bind,푝 = 푘푥 (휃̂) + 푞
Likewise, since the objective is linear in 푝 and 푞, the optimal signal, 휋 , is described by either푝 = 1, and 푞 = 1 − 푘푥 (휃̂) (4)
or 푞 = 0, and 푝 = 푘푥 (휃̂) (5)
Consequently, the optimal commitment solution (and hence the optimal information struc-
ture) is either i. given by a signal 휋 , with 푝 and 푞 described as in the two pairs of equations4 and 5, and the corresponding 휃̂ that maximizes 푉 ; or ii. given by an equilibrium in which
the receiver obtains the pooling payo (which she can always obtain trivially).
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Now, let’s examine the example with the following parameters and functional forms. Let퐹 be the uniform distribution, 푑 be 2/3, 푘 be 1/3 and 푥(휃) = 휃 . Then, the value function
reduces to 푉 = 푞 휃̂22 − 23푞휃̂ + 푝 1 − 휃̂22 − 23푝 (1 − 휃̂) + 23
Substituting in 푝 = 1 and 푞 = 1 − 1/(3휃̂), we have푉 = (1 − 13휃̂) 휃̂22 − 23 (1 − 13휃̂) 휃̂ + 1 − 휃̂22 − 23 (1 − 휃̂) + 23
which reduces to 푉 = −3휃̂ − 1318
Hence 휃̂ = 1/3, 푝 = 1 and 푞 = 0. This yields the receiver a payo of 2/3.
On the other hand, if 푞 = 0 and 푝 = 1/(3휃̂), we have푉 = ( 13휃̂) 1 − 휃̂22 − 23 ( 13휃̂)(1 − 휃̂) + 23
which reduces to 푉 = − 휃̂6 − 118휃̂ + 89
This expression is maximized at 휃̂ = 1/√3. Hence 푝 = 1/√3, 푞 = 0, and the receiver obtains a
payo of (8 − √3) /9 > 2/3.
Because of the digital format of the AEA mechanism, the optimal signal 휋 can be imple-
mented quite naturally: via an email lter. Hence, with this formulation of the problem and
in this parameter universe, schools would do better by using a lter that only reveals the
candidate’s wave 1/√3 of the time. As a result, upon receiving a wave from the candidate,
the school will grant him an interview. If no such wave arrives, then the school will not.
6 Discussion
The main feature of the optimal information structure, or degree of transparency, in simple
signaling games with two actions is that the receiver-optimal equilibrium under the optimal
degree of transparency enables the receiver to achieve the same payo as in the case wherein
she had the power of committing ex ante to a (mixed) strategy conditioned on the signal
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choice of the sender. This is both remarkable, that for a broad class of games information
design is as good as commitment; and useful, since the receiver’s commitment problem is
merely a linear program.
We also nd that in simple games with two actions, information design guarantees that
value of information is always positive–the receiver always benets from ex ante informa-
tion, no matter the form it takes. This contrasts sharply with the ndings in Whitmeyer
(2019) [33], where we discover that with full transparency information may hurt the receiver,
even in binary action simple games.
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A Section 3 Proofs
A.1 Proposition 3.5 Proof
There are 푛 states, 푡 messages and 2 actions for the receiver. From Lemma 3.2, in searching
for the optimal commitment solution it is without loss to restrict our search to those in which
each type of sender chooses a pure strategy. Hence, we may write the receiver’s objective
function as 푉 = 푛∑푖=1 휇0(휃푖) (휋푖푣푖푗(푖) + (1 − 휋푖)푤 푖푗(푖))
where 푗(푖) is the message chosen by sender 푖, and 휋푖 is the probability the receiver plays 푎1
after message 푗(푖). The obedience constraints are
푛∑푖 휇(휃푖)휋푖푣푖푗(푖) ≥ 푛∑푖 휇(휃푖)휋푖푤 푖푗(푖)푛∑푖 휇(휃푖)(1 − 휋푖)푤 푖푗(푖) ≥ 푛∑푖 휇(휃푖)(1 − 휋푖)푣푖푗(푖)
provided both actions are recommended with positive probability.
Since, absent strategic concerns, each sender type prefers 푚1, if the receiver chooses no
transparency then each sender type will choose 푚1. Moreover without loss of generality
suppose that in such an equilibrium the receiver’s optimal action is 푎1; hence, ∑푛푖=1 휇(휃푖)푣푖1 ≥∑푛푖=1 휇(휃푖)푤 푖1.
There are three cases to consider; 1a, 1b, and 2. Case 1: Each action is optimal for some
state, message combination; and Case 1a: In the commitment solution, each action is rec-
ommended with positive probability. Then, the receiver must be able to do (at least weakly)
better than the no transparency equilibrium in her commitment solution:푛∑푖=1 휇0(휃푖) (휋푖푣푖푗(푖) + (1 − 휋푖)푤 푖푗(푖)) ≥ 푛∑푖=1 휇(휃푖)푤 푖1
Or, 푛∑푖 휇(휃푖)휋푖푣푖푗(푖) ≥ 푛∑푖 휇(휃푖)휋푖푤 푖푗(푖) + 푛∑푖=1 휇(휃푖) (푤 푖1 − 푤 푖푗(푖))≥ 푛∑푖 휇(휃푖)휋푖푤 푖푗(푖)
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where the last line follows from Condition 3.4. We conclude that the rst obedience con-
straint is always satised under the commitment solution. Likewise,푛∑푖=1 휇0(휃푖) (휋푖푣푖푗(푖) + (1 − 휋푖)푤 푖푗(푖)) ≥ 푛∑푖=1 휇(휃푖)푣푖1
Or, 푛∑푖 휇(휃푖)(1 − 휋푖)푤 푖푗(푖) ≥ 푛∑푖=1 휇(휃푖) (푣푖1 − 휋푖푣푖푗(푖))≥ 푛∑푖 휇(휃푖)(1 − 휋푖)푣푖푗(푖)
where the last line follows from Condition 3.4. Thus, the second obedience constraint is also
always satised under the commitment solution.
Case 1b: Each action is not recommended with positive probability in the commitment
solution. Following the recommendation of the on-path action, the proof is identical to that
of case 1a. Following the recommendation of the o-path action, the receiver’s belief is
undened. However, since there is some message/state combination in which the o-path
action is optimal, there is always a belief that we can stipulate such that the directive to play
the o-path action would be obeyed.
Case 2: For all state and message combinations only one action is optimal, say action 푎1.
Then, since there is an equilibrium under no transparency in which the senders pool on the
receiver’s favorite message, 푚1, this must be the optimal commitment solution as well (the
best message and the best action). Moreover, this must satisfy obedience as well since the
directive to choose 푎2 will never be sent.
The result is proved: the commitment solution coincides with the optimal transparency
solution.
A.2 Proposition 3.6 Proof
Proof. Consider any two action, simple, signaling game with payos denoted by 푣푖 ∶= 푢푅(푎1, 휃푖)
and 푤푖 ∶= 푢푅(푎2, 휃푖); and let there exist some 휃푖 such that 푣푖 > 푤푖 and some 휃푘 such that푤푘 > 푣푘 . Moreover, let 푉 (휇0) > 푛∑푖=1 휇0 (휃푖) 푣푖 (퐴1)
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and 푉 (휇0) > 푛∑푖=1 휇0 (휃푖)푤푖 (퐴2)
By construction, from Inequalities 퐴1 and 퐴2 the obedience constraints must be slack
(simply rearrange them as in the proof of Theorem 3.3), i.e.
푛∑푖=1 휇0 (휃푖) 푣푖휋푖 > 푛∑푖=1 휇0 (휃푖)푤푖휋푖 (퐴3)푛∑푖=1 휇0 (휃푖)푤푖 (1 − 휋푖) > 푛∑푖=1 휇0 (휃푖) 푣푖 (1 − 휋푖) (퐴4)
Or, 푛∑푖=1 휇0 (휃푖) 푣푖휋푖 = 푛∑푖=1 휇0 (휃푖)푤푖휋푖 + 훿1 (퐴5)푛∑푖=1 휇0 (휃푖)푤푖 (1 − 휋푖) = 푛∑푖=1 휇0 (휃푖) 푣푖 (1 − 휋푖) + 훿2 (퐴6)
for constants 훿1 > 0 and 훿2 > 0.
Then, consider any non-simple perturbation of the game with 푢푅(푎1, 푚푗 , 휃푖) = 푣푖+휔(푎1, 푚푗 , 휃푖)
and 푢푅(푎2, 푚푗 , 휃푖) = 푤푖+휔(푎2, 푚푗 , 휃푖). As in the proof of Proposition 3.5, denote by 푗(푖) the mes-
sage chosen by sender 푖. Hence, we may rewrite 휔(푎1, 푚푗 , 휃푖) as 휖푗(푖) and 휔(푎2, 푚푗 , 휃푖) as 휂푗(푖).
Accordingly, 푢푅 (푎1, 푚푗 , 휃푖) = 푢푅 (푎1, 휃푖) + 휖푗(푖) = 푣푖 + 휖푗(푖)
and 푢푅 (푎2, 푚푗 , 휃푖) = 푢푅 (푎2, 휃푖) + 휂푗(푖) = 푤푖 + 휂푗(푖)
Hence, in the perturbed game, the obedience constraints, 퐴5 and 퐴6, become푛∑푖=1 휇0 (휃푖) (푣푖 + 휖푗(푖)) 휋푖 ≥ 푛∑푖=1 휇0 (휃푖) (푤푖 + 휂푗(푖)) 휋푖 (퐴7)푛∑푖=1 휇0 (휃푖) (푤푖 + 휂푗(푖)) (1 − 휋푖) ≥ 푛∑푖=1 휇0 (휃푖) (푣푖 + 휖푗(푖)) (1 − 휋푖) (퐴8)
Or, 푛∑푖=1 휇0 (휃푖) 푣푖휋푖 ≥ 푛∑푖=1 휇0 (휃푖)푤푖휋푖 + 훾 (퐴9)푛∑푖=1 휇0 (휃푖)푤푖 (1 − 휋푖) ≥ 푛∑푖=1 휇0 (휃푖) 푣푖 (1 − 휋푖) + 휎 (퐴10)
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where 훾 = 푛∑푖=1 휇0(휃푖)휋푖 (휂푗(푖) − 휖푗(푖)) , and 휎 = 푛∑푖=1 휇0(휃푖) (1 − 휋푖) (휖푗(푖) − 휂푗(푖))
Then, since 훿1 and 훿2 are positive constants, there must be some 휏 > 0 such that if |휔(푎푙 , 푚푗 , 휃푖)| ≤휏 for all 푎푙 ∈ 퐴, for all 푚푗 ∈ 푀 and for all 휃푖 ∈ Θ then 훾 ≤ 훿1 and 휎 ≤ 훿2; and hence the obedi-
ence constraints are satised.
Of course, it remains to verify optimality in the perturbed game. However, recall that in
the commitment problem, for each vector of pure strategies of the sender types, the receiver
solves a linear program. The constraint set is a convex polytope and hence the optimum must
lie at a vertex of this object. There are nitely many vertices, and nitely many messages,
hence nitely many possible vectors of pure strategies. Thus, there are only nitely many
combinations of these things that could constitute an optimum. Without loss of generality,
suppose that in the simple game, the optimum is unique. That is, the receiver’s payo, 푣푟∗,
at the optimum is strictly better than her payo from any other vertex, vector of messages
combination. Equivalently,푣푟 ∗ ∶= 푉 (휇0) = 푛∑푖=1 휇0(휃푖) [휋푖푣푖 + (1 − 휋푖)푤푖] > 푣푟 (퐴11)
for all 푟 ∈ 푅 where 푅 is the (nite) set of all vertex, pure-strategy message vector combi-
nations except for the optimal combination (푟 ∗), and 푣푟 is the receiver’s payo for vertex,
pure-strategy message vector combination 푟 . Inequality 퐴11 can be rewritten as푣푟 ∗ = 푣푟 + 휄푟 (퐴12)
where for each 푟 , 휄푟 > 0 is a constant. Now, consider the perturbed game, where for 푟 ∗ we
have 푣̂푟 ∗ = 푛∑푖=1 휇0(휃푖) [휋푖 (푣푖 + 휖푗(푖)) + (1 − 휋푖) (푤푖 + 휂푗(푖))]= 푛∑푖=1 휇0(휃푖) [휋푖푣푖 + (1 − 휋푖)푤푖] + 훽= 푣푟 ∗ + 훽
where 푣̂푟∗ is the receiver’s payo in the perturbed game for the (previously optimal) 푟 ∗ and훽 = 푛∑푖=1 휇0(휃푖) [휋푖휖푗(푖) + (1 − 휋푖) 휂푗(푖)]
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Likewise, for any other 푟 , we have in the perturbed game 푣̂푟 = 푣푟+훼푟 . Hence, if 푣푟 ∗+훽 ≥ 푣푟+훼푟
for all 푟 , then 푟 ∗ is optimal.
Then, since 휄푟 is a positive constant for any 푟 , there must be some 휌 > 0 such that if|휔(푎푙 , 푚푗 , 휃푖)| ≤ 휌 for all 푎푙 ∈ 퐴, for all 푚푗 ∈ 푀 and for all 휃푖 ∈ Θ, then 훼푟 − 훽 ≤ 휄푟 for all 푟 ; and
hence 푟 ∗ is optimal. Finally, dene 휅 ∶= min {휏 , 휌}, and the result is shown.
We have made the implicit assumption that each recommendation will be sent with pos-
itive probability on path in the simple game. However, if that is not the case, then upon
the instruction to choose the o-path action, we may assign the receiver’s belief so that the
action is sequentially rational since if the perturbations are suciently small then there are
beliefs such that actions 푎1 and 푎2 are sequentially rational.
The result is proved: the commitment solution coincides with the optimal transparency
solution provided the game is almost simple. ■
A.3 Opacity ≠ Commitment for Three or More Actions, in Detail
Here, we proceed through the modied Beer Quiche example of Section 3.2 in detail. In the
commitment problem, the receiver may commit to a behavioral strategy 휋 ∶ 푀 → Δ(퐴). We
may write 휋 in the form of four probabilities, 푝, 푟 , 푞, and 푠, with푝 ∶= 휋 (푓 |퐵) , 푟 ∶= 휋 (푛푓 |퐵) , 푞 ∶= 휋 (푓 |푄) , and 푠 ∶= 휋 (푛푓 |푄)
From Lemma 3.2 it is without loss of generality to restrict our search for the receiver-optimal
commitment equilibria to ones in which each sender type chooses a pure strategy. Moreover,
it is clear that equilibria in which the senders pool will beget a payo to the receiver of 휇0.
Let’s consider the separating equilibrium in which the strong guy chooses beer and the wimp,
quiche: 휎푆 = 1 and 휎푊 = 0. Hence, the receiver’s problem can be rewritten asmax푝,푟 ,푞,푠 {12 [1 + 휇0 (푟 − 푝) + (1 − 휇0) (푞 − 푠)]}
such that
5푟 + 1 ≥ 4푠 (S1)
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4푝 + 2 ≥ 5푞 (S2)
We also have the (possibly slack) constraints that 푝 + 푟 ≤ 1 and 푞 + 푠 ≤ 1. This is
straightforward to solve and for 휇0 > 1/2, 푝 = 0, 푟 = 1, 푞 = 2/5, and 푠 = 0. The corresponding
payo is 푉 = 12 (1 + 휇0 + (1 − 휇0) 25) = 12 (75 + 35휇0)
It is easy to verify that the other separating equilibrium is not as fruitful for the receiver.
Of course, the question remains as to whether the receiver could achieve the same payo
under some equilibrium in which the senders mix. We need this because we are providing
a counter-example to opacity = commitment for three actions–otherwise we would leave
open the possibility that there is a commitment solution in which some type(s) mix that can
be achieved through the optimal degree of transparency. However, it is simple to verify that
there is no optimal equilibrium under commitment in which at least one sender type chooses
a non-degenerate mixed strategy. That is, the equilibrium above, in which the strong type
chooses beer, the wimp chooses quiche, and the receiver commits to 푝 = 푠 = 0, 푟 = 1 and푞 = 2/5, is uniquely optimal.
B Section 4 Proofs
B.1 Proposition 4.2 Proof
Proof. Recall that from Lemma 3.2 it is without loss of generality in the receiver’s commit-
ment problem to restrict the sender to pure strategies. Hence, the receiver solvesmax휋,푠 { 푛∑푖=1 휇0(휃푖) 푘∑푙=1 휋 (푎푙 |푚푖) 푢푅 (푚푖 , 푎푙 , 휃푖)}
such that 푘∑푙=1 휋 (푎푙 |푚푖) 푢푆 (푚푖 , 푎푙 , 휃푖) ≥ 푘∑푙=1 휋 (푎푙 |푚′푖 ) 푢푆 (푚′푖 , 푎푙 , 휃푖)
for all 휃푖 ,푚′푖 , where 푠 is a vector of pure strategies chosen by the sender types and message푚푖
is the message chosen by type 휃푖 (of course it is possible that 푚푖 = 푚푘 for 푘 ≠ 푖 if types 휃푖 and휃푘 choose the same message). For a xed vector of pure strategies this is a linear program.
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Naturally, the payos of the game may be such that for some vector of pure strategies,
there exists no signal that is incentive compatible. Note also that because this is the com-
mitment problem, incentive compatibility is independent of the prior 휇0. Next dene set 퐹 as
the set of all pairs of signals and strategy vectors that are incentive compatible, with element푓 ∶= (휋, 푠). For any 푓 ∈ 퐹 , we have푉푓 (휇0) = 푛∑푖=1 휇0(휃푖) 푘∑푙=1 휋 (푎푙 |푚푖) 푢푅 (푚푖 , 푎푙 , 휃푖)
and observe that푉푓 (휆휇′0 + (1 − 휆)휇′′0 ) = 푛∑푖=1 (휆휇′0(휃푖) + (1 − 휆)휇′′0 (휃푖)) 푘∑푙=1 휋 (푎푙 |푚푖) 푢푅 (푚푖 , 푎푙 , 휃푖)= 휆 푛∑푖=1 휇′0(휃푖) 푘∑푙=1 휋 (푎푙 |푚푖) 푢푅 (푚푖 , 푎푙 , 휃푖)+ (1 − 휆) 푛∑푖=1 휇′′0 (휃푖) 푘∑푙=1 휋 (푎푙 |푚푖) 푢푅 (푚푖 , 푎푙 , 휃푖)= 휆푉푓 (휇′0) + (1 − 휆)푉푓 (휇′′0 )
for any 휆 ∈ [0, 1]. Therefore, 푉푓 is convex in 휇0.
Furthermore, it is easy to see that 푉 ∗(휇0) ∶= 푚푎푥휋,푠푉 (휇0) = max푓 푉푓 (휇0). Since 푉푓 is
convex, epi푉푓 is also convex. Then, epi푉 ∗ = epimax푓 푉푓 = ∩푓 ∈퐹 epi푉푓 . Since the intersection
of convex sets is also convex, epi푉 ∗ is also convex, hence 푉 ∗(휇0) is convex in 휇0. Note also
that 푉 ∗(휇0) is continuous in 휇0 and since it is a “proper convex function" (Rockafellar (1970)
[29]) it must be dierentiable almost everywhere (Theorem 25.5, Rockafellar [29]).
Finally, by Jensen’s inequality, the receiver always (at least weakly) prefers to obtain
information ex ante. ■
C Section 5 (Examples) Derivations
C.1 Investor Example (Section 5.1) Derivation
We rst look for the optimal commitment strategy should the senders separate fully. We
make the ansatz that type 9/10’s IC constraint doesn’t bind, in which case we want to have
him choose 푟 to be as high as possible so that the other types have the least incentive to
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imitate him: so 9/10 chooses 푟 = 1. Likewise, it is also clear that we want to have type 3/10
choose his myopic optimum so that he has the least incentive to deviate: so 3/10 chooses푟 = 0. Finally, we have 3/5 choose 푟 ∈ (0, 1).
We summarize 휋 in terms of 3 variables, 푘, 푙, and 푚, where푘 ∶= 휋 (푏푢푦 |0), 푙 ∶= 휋 (푏푢푦 |푟), and 푚 ∶= 휋 (푏푢푦 |1)
and the CEO maximizes푉 = 13푘( 310 − 710) + 13 푙 (35 − 710) + 13푚( 910 − 710)
such that 1 + 35푘 ≥ 310√1 + 푟 + 710√1 − 푟 + 35 푙1 + 35푘 ≥ 310√2 + 35푚
and 35√1 + 푟 + 25√1 − 푟 + 35 푙 ≥ 35√2 + 35푚
where we assume (for now) that the other constraints are slack. It is straightforward to solve
this and obtain푙 = 53 − 173√41 ≈ .78, 푚 = 53 − √2 + 4√41 ≈ .88, 푘 = 0, and 푟 = 4041 ≈ .98
Likewise, it is simple to verify that the other IC constraints hold. Moreover, we can stipulate
that following any o-path message the receiver is never recommended to buy the rm,
and so the sender never wishes to deviate to an o path message. Thus, this constitutes an
equilibrium.
The payo from this separating equilibrium is strictly higher than the pooling payo, so
it remains to check that there are no better equilibria in which two types of sender pool. It
is easy to verify that none exist that yield the receiver a payo that is as high as she can
get from full separation (although there is an equilibrium in which 3/5 and 9/10 pool that is
almost as good). Hence, we conclude that the 휋 described above, in conjunction with a fully
separating equilibrium, is optimal.
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C.2 Regime Change Example (Section 5.2) Derivation
This scenario satises the conditions for Proposition 3.5 to hold. Thus, opacity = commit-
ment. Hence, let us solve the commitment problem. Suppose the incumbent types separate,푥푏 chooses 푟 and 푥푔 chooses 푟 ′ > 푟 . The receiver commits to the following: she chooses1 with probability 푝 following (푟 , 퐵), with probability 푞 following (푟 , 퐺), with probability 푥
following (푟 ′, 퐵), and with probability 푦 following (푟 ′, 퐺).
The receiver’s value function is
푉 = 휇0 {푏푝(1 − 푟) + (1 − 푏)푞(1 − 푟)} + (1 − 휇0)푦(−푟 ′)
and the incentive compatibility constraints are푏 [푝(−푟) + (1 − 푝)(푥푏 − 푟)] + (1 − 푏) [푞(−푟) + (1 − 푞)(푥푏 − 푟)]≥ 푏 [푥(−푟 ′) + (1 − 푥)(푥푏 − 푟 ′)] + (1 − 푏) [푦(−푟 ′) + (1 − 푦)(푥푏 − 푟 ′)]
and [푦(푥푔 − 1 − 푟 ′) + (1 − 푦)(푥푔 − 푟 ′)] ≥ [푞(푥푔 − 1 − 푟) + (1 − 푞)(푥푔 − 푟)]
Suppose that the second constraint is slack. The rst constraint may be rewritten as푥푏(1 − 푏)(푦 − 푞) + 푥푏푏(푥 − 푝) + 푟 ′ − 푟 ≥ 0
It is clear that we can set 푥 = 1, and that this constraint must bind. Thus,푞 = 푦 + 푏1 − 푏 (1 − 푝) + 푟 ′ − 푟푥푏(1 − 푏)
We substitute in for 푞 into the value function and obtain푉 = 휇0{(1 − 푏)푦(1 − 푟) + 푏(1 − 푟) + (푟 ′ − 푟)푥푏 (1 − 푟)} + (1 − 휇0)푦(−푟 ′)
The derivative of 푉 with respect to 푦 is휇0(1 − 푏)(1 − 푟) + (1 − 휇0)(−푟 ′) < 휇0(1 − 푏)(1 − 푟̄) + (1 − 휇0)(−푟̄) < 0
where the second inequality follows from Inequality 3. Likewise, the derivative with respect
to 푟 is −휇0((1 − 푏)푦 + 푏 + 1 − 푟 + 푟 ′ − 푟푥푏 ) < 0
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and with respect to 푟 ′ is 휇0 1 − 푟푥푏 − (1 − 휇0)푦
which is positive for 푦 suciently small. Thus, it is clear that 푉 is maximized at 푝 = 1, 푦 = 0,푟 = 푟̄ , 푟 ′ = 푟̄ , and 푞 = 푟̄ − 푟̄푥푏(1 − 푏)
Moreover, recall 푥 = 1. The incentive compatibility constraint for 푥푔 reduces to(푟̄ − 푟̄) (1 − 푥푏(1 − 푏)) ≥ 0
which obviously holds. Deviations to o-path 푟 can be neutralized by imposing that the
receiver is recommended to overthrow should any 푟 other than 푟̄ or 푟̄ be chosen.
It is easy to verify that this equilibrium results in a strictly higher payo than any pool-
ing equilibrium, or any separating equilibrium in which 푟 ′ < 푟 . Hence, this degree of trans-
parency and this equilibrium are optimal for the receiver.
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